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A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors’
Counsel1
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.2 & Edward B. Rock3
Abstract
Over the last thirty years, the independent directors have occasionally been
represented by independent counsel. Instances include: special litigation
committees reviewing derivative suits; independent committees in parent
subsidiary mergers and MBOs; and internal investigations of misconduct. We
predict that, with the additional legal requirements imposed on independent
directors by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and related changes to SEC rules and Stock
Exchange listing requirements, the independent directors, especially those on the
Audit Committee, increasingly will be represented on a continuing basis by
independent legal counsel. Out of this will emerge a new figure in the board
room: the Independent Directors' Counsel. We examine the advantages and
disadvantages of adding this new actor in the boardroom, and consider issues
posed and implications for corporate law and legal ethics.
The part-time job of counsel for the occasional special committee of independent
directors is about to become a continuing engagement. Over the last thirty years,
independent directors have occasionally been represented by independent counsel.
Examples include: special litigation committees reviewing derivative suits; independent
committees in parent-subsidiary mergers and MBOs; and internal investigations of
misconduct. We predict that, with the additional legal requirement imposed on
independent directors by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and related changes to SEC rules and
Stock Exchange listing requirements, the independent directors, especially those on
the Audit Committee, will begin to be represented on a continuing basis by independent
legal counsel. Out of this will emerge a new figure in the board room: the Independent
Directors’ Counsel.
In this Article, we trace the development of counsel for independent directors,
identify the forces that are transforming the nature of the engagement, and begin to
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analyze the promise and pitfalls of adding this new actor in the boardroom, including the
implications for corporate law and legal ethics.4

I.

Emerging Role of Independent Directors’ Counsel

Over the last thirty years and more, we have seen the emergence of a distinctive role
in the boardroom: Counsel for the independent directors. The role has emerged out of the
engagement of counsel in several specific contexts for specific tasks. In this section, we
review that history.
A.

The Special Litigation Committee in Derivative Suits

When shareholders seek to sue directors for a breach of fiduciary duty, they
typically must do so through a derivative suit, that is, a suit that is brought on behalf of
the corporation. The board ordinarily has the ultimate decision over whether the
corporation should prosecute litigation. In a derivative suit, a shareholder seeks to
displace the board of directors, or more particularly a decision or inaction, and, as a
result, the shareholders’ suit is subject to special requirements. In particular, shareholders
must assert that the board is unable or unwilling or incapable of acting.
In corporate law, this issue is normally resolved through determination of
whether shareholders must make a demand on the board of directors to sue (“demand
required”) or whether the board is unable to make such a decision (“demand excused”).
When demand is required, and the board decides not to pursue an action, that decision
will typically be reviewed under the deferential business judgment rule.
Demand is excused, under Delaware law, if the shareholder establishes a
reasonable doubt that the directors are disinterested and independent, or that the
challenged transaction otherwise was not the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment.5 To meet this requirement, the complaining shareholder must do more than
name all the directors as defendants; the complainant must also plead sufficient facts to
create a reasonable doubt of board independence in the mind of the Delaware Chancellor.
What, then, happens if demand is excused? It was once the rule that when demand
was excused, the derivative plaintiff simply prosecuted the claim. Delaware’s approach
shifted, however, during the 1980s. In the seminal case of Zapata v. Maldonado,6 the
Delaware courts took the view that the board’s lack of independence that led to excusing
4

Jim Cox, working from a different direction, has discussed the possibility of using independent counsel to
empower outside directors. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering
the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1077 (2003).
5

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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demand was not necessarily permanent or irreversibly disabling. In particular, if the
board established a special committee of uninvolved directors (typically newly appointed
ones), and delegated the decision whether to proceed with the litigation to that
committee, then the committee could assume the authority of the board, and reassert
control over the litigation. That has become the established practice not only in Delaware
but in other jurisdictions as well.7
In order for the directors to reassert control through the special committee, and
prevail on a motion to terminate the litigation, the burden is on the special litigation
committee (“SLC”) to convince the court that “(1) its members were independent; (2)
that they acted in good faith; and (3) that they had reasonable bases for their
recommendations.”8 If the SLC meets this burden, the court may grant the committee’s
motion or, in its discretion, permit the litigation to proceed if, in its “judicial business
judgment,” it concludes that proceeding is in the best interests of the company.9
One key factor in a SLC’s ability to meet its burden is the retention of genuinely
independent counsel to guide the SLC through its obligations and to aid in the evaluation
of the merits of the underlying claim. To maximize the likelihood that an SLC’s
recommendation to terminate the litigation will be respected, the SLC is well advised to
retain counsel with no prior relationship with the company.10 Retaining such counsel has
become standard practice.
B.

Special Committees in the MBO and Parent-Subsidiary Merger
Contexts

A second context for appointing special counsel is a management buyout
(“MBO”) or a parent-subsidiary merger. Both transactions raise obvious conflicts of
interest on the part of management. In each case, the would-be acquirer (management or
the parent) would like to acquire the remaining shares at the lowest possible price, but
also owes a duty to the company to pay fair value. Various protocols and bright line rules

7

See, Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (NY 1979).

8

In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, Del Ch. June 17, 2003, slip op at 22, citing Zapata, 430 A/2d
779, 788-89 (del. 1981); Katell v. Morgan Stanley Group, 1995 WL 376952, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 15,
1995).
9

In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the burden that the committee must meet on each issue
is “akin” to that on summary judgment. Zapata at 788.
10

For an example of a case where the court rejected to recommendation to terminate an action, despite the
presence of a genuinely independent counsel, see In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation, CA 18751
(Del. Ch. June 17, 2003).
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have been proposed – such as per se prohibition on “going private” transactions.11 The
practice that has emerged, however, has been much more nuanced.12
In both contexts, the developing Delaware jurisprudence encourages (although
does not mandate) the use of a substantively independent, active and effective committee
of independent directors to represent the interests of the non-controlling shareholders.
The effect of such a committee – and thus the inducement to create one – is to shift
litigation burdens from the conflicted fiduciary (management or the controlling
shareholder) to the non-controlling shareholders. The shift typically is that of the burden
of proof. In some cases, the use of a special committee can also shift of the standard of
review from “entire fairness” to business judgment rule.13
For use of such a special committee to have this effect, the committee must be
shown to be active and independent, and not merely “formally” so. This independence
depends, in significant measure, on whether the committee hires independent advisers –
counsel independent of the management or parent company and investment bankers who
can advise on valuation. In the jurisprudence that has developed, the performance of
counsel for the committee has been viewed as particularly important. For example, in
Kahn v. Tremont,14 the fact that the special committee chose counsel who were
recommended by, and had previously worked for, the parent company was a factor in the
court’s conclusion that the special committee was not independent.
C.

Independent Counsel in Internal Investigations.

Another context in which independent directors have retained independent
counsel is that of internal investigations. When a company launches an internal
investigation in the wake of a scandal, the credibility of the investigation depends in no
small measure on the perception that the law firm conducting the investigation is
independent of the potential wrong doers. To take but one example, when Enron
launched an investigation of accounting irregularities, it appointed a special committee of
directors, who in turn retained special outside legal counsel, which was largely (although
not totally) independent of Enron.15
11

See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 Yale L. J.
1354 (1975) (proposing a prohibition on management buyouts).
12

See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1009 (1997).

13

When the transaction is between a controlling shareholder and the firm, the standard is always entire
fairness; when the transaction is between a director and the firm, the use of an genuinely independent
special committee can shift both the burden (to the challenging shareholders) as well as the standard (from
entire fairness to business judgment rule). Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997).
14

694 A.2d 422, 428-30 (Del. 1997).
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In the five years previous, counsel for the special committee, Wilmer Cutler and Pickering, had
represented in matters unrelated to the transactions at issue, specifically, an Enron subsidiary before the
U.S. Supreme Court, and in a merger proceeding in the EU. William Powers Report to the Board of
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D.

Other Contexts

The scandals at Enron and elsewhere have led to pervading suspicion of
business management, particularly where top level managers stand to realize unusual
personal gain from their corporate positions. Current topics of concern include the proper
level of executive compensation and transactions of executives with related entities. It is
a fair prediction that the employment of special board committees comprised of
independent directors will find wider uses. And the special committees will typically
require special counsel.
II.

The Big Bang: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Stock Exchange Rules

As described above, the retention of independent outside counsel for independent
directors is not a new development. Indeed, it has become routine on a transactionspecific or engagement-specific basis. Currently, corporate management would be ill
advised to attempt a parent-subsidiary merger or a management buyout without
establishing a special committee of independent directors who are assisted by genuinely
independent counsel. Similarly, one would not sensibly incur the costs of establishing a
special litigation committee to evaluate derivative litigation without ensuring that the
committee hired independent outside counsel. It would simply be a waste.
Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) is important not because it invents the role of
independent director, but, rather, because it makes a variety of corporate functions
mandatory and vastly increases their legal complexity, and consequently enhances the
requirements of corporate judgment that can withstand question or challenge. This
complexity, we assert, will lead to an expansion of lawyers’ roles.
SOX changes the regulatory landscape for publicly traded corporations in two
ways: It does so directly through new process requirements; and it does so indirectly
through changes in the stock exchanges’ listing agreements that were encouraged by the
SEC in its supervisory role over self regulatory organizations. (“Encouraged” is an
understatement.)
Once SOX, the SEC rules, and the changes in the stock exchange listing
requirements take effect, the institution of the board will be fundamentally changed, if
not transformed.
The most significant change is with regard to the Audit Committee. Under the new
regime:

Directors of the Enron Corporation, February 1, 2002 (“Powers Report”) at fn. 4, on file with the authors
(also available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf).
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•

The Audit Committee of a corporation subject to the new regime will be
comprised solely of independent directors.16 Moreover, the company must
disclose whether at least one of the members of the Audit Committee is a
“financial expert” and if not, why not.17

•

The Audit Committee statutorily will be “directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public
accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of disagreements
between management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) for the
purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and each such
registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee.”18

•

The Audit Committee will have to “establish procedures for – (A) the receipt,
retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the
confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.”19

•

The Audit Committee will have to pre-approve audit and permissible non-audit
services.20

•

The Audit Committee must have a “charter that addresses a list of specified
duties, responsibilities and purposes, one of which must be to ‘assist board
oversight of (1) the integrity of the company’s financial statements . . . [and] (2)
the company’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.”21

•

Part of the Audit Committee’s responsibility is to monitor and ensure that the
audit engagement team not overstay its permissible term. (The term limit is five
years on, five years off for the audit partner, and no member of the audit team
may accept a financial reporting job with the issuer without first observing a one
year cooling off period.)22

16

SOX §301, Securities Exchange Act §10A(m)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-1.

17

SOX §407, 15 U.S.C.A. §7265.

18

SOX §301 (2), Exchange Act §10A(m)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-1.

19

SOX §301(4), Exchange Act §10A(m)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-1.

20

SOX 202, Exchange Act §10A(i), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-1.

21

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company Manual §303A(7)(b)(i)(A), available at
http://www.nyse.com. Bart Schwartz and Jonathan Freedman, Corporate Counsel: Accounting Scandals,
the New Rules and Board Culture, NYLJ Oct. 10, 2002 at p. 5, col. 1.
22

Exchange Act §10A(j) and (l), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-1.
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•

The Audit Committee must also monitor audit partner compensation to ensure
that the audit partner does not get paid based on non-audit services provided to the
issuer.

•

The Audit Committee will have the authority to engage independent counsel and
other advisers it deems necessary, at company expense.23

In addition to these prescribed responsibilities, additional duties devolve on the Audit
Committee as derivative from the increased obligations on other actors. Thus, for
example, the CEO and CFO must certify that they have disclosed to the audit committee
“(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which
could adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report
financial data and . . . (B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls.”24 When
such disclosures are made, the Audit Committee, as the prime decision maker with regard
to accounting functions, will presumably be obliged to act.25
Similarly, Section 307 of SOX requires attorneys to report “up-the-ladder”
evidence of securities law or fiduciary duty violations by the company or its agents. In
the first instance, the attorney should report to the chief legal counsel or the CEO. If the
counsel or the officer does not respond appropriately, the attorney must then report the
evidence to the audit committee or to another committee comprised entirely of
independent directors, such as a “qualified legal compliance committee.” As before, the
audit committee presumably has an obligation to act once it has received such a report.
As one commentator has noted, the new responsibilities of the audit committee
“may require the audit committee to be in regular, sometimes continuous, communication
with the outside auditors, and members may expect the committee to be at times as a
practical matter in continuous session.”26
Microsoft’s most recent proxy statement provides a dramatic illustration of the
sheer magnitude of the Audit Committee’s responsibilities. The last three pages contains
the “Audit Committee Responsibilities Calendar” with thirty-two separate entries.27
SOX’s changes to the Audit Committee are the most far reaching. However, the
other main board committees – the Nominating and Compensation committees – will also
23

SOX §301(5) and (6), Exchange Act §10A(m)(5) and (6), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-1.

24

SOX §302, 15 U.S.C.A. §7241.

25

Peter M. Collins, Outside Counsel: Sarbanes-Oxley Act Creates a New Role for the Audit Committee,
NYLJ Oct. 17, 2002 at page 4, col. 4.

26

Collins, supra note __.

27

Microsoft 2003 Proxy Statement (September 29, 2003).
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be transformed. Like the Audit Committee, they must be staffed by independent
directors.28
Finally, non-management directors will be required to meet regularly without
management.29
We close this section with a brief thought experiment. For your sins, or perhaps
because you are a glutton for punishment, or just want to do the right thing, you have
agreed to become a member of the Audit Committee of a publicly held corporation.
Perhaps, because you have a lot of time on your hands, you have agreed to sit on the
Compensation or Nomination committee as well. You very much want to do the right
thing. You have reviewed the duties that have been imposed on independent directors of
publicly held firms. You are aware of the various roles that independent counsel has
played in the past. You know that SOX mandates that the Audit Committee have the
authority to retain independent counsel at company expense. You also want to be able to
get director liability coverage. You suspect that “[i]nsurance carriers who write
directors’ liability policies may be expected to consider measures encouraging their audit
committee insureds to undertake proactive self-defense measures, including careful
memorialization of their endeavors and engagement of the independent counsel and
advisers contemplated in Section 301(m)(1).”30 Can you seriously imagine not retaining
independent counsel at least for the Audit Committee, given that it looks like that
committee may, as a practical matter, be in continuous session?
Or run the thought experiment slightly differently. Suppose that a CEO is
recruiting someone to join the board and to chair the Audit Committee. The potential
director indicates interest but, prior to agreeing, asks that the audit committee be provided
with its own, independent counsel.31 Can the CEO turn down the request? Will the CEO
turn it down? If the CEO refuses, what signal will it send?
III.

Reaching the Tipping Point: From Transaction Representation to
Ongoing Role

We make a prediction. Some independent directors, especially those who serve
on an Audit Committee, will conclude that they are better off with independent counsel
appointed on a standing basis. Their special counsel will be available to guide them
through the complexities of the new structure, and be up to speed if any thing untoward
should happen (like an employee reporting misconduct to the audit committee). Once an
independent lawyer is hired for the Audit Committee, that lawyer will, over time, become
the counsel for the independent directors more generally, and guide them through their
obligations on the Compensation Committee, the Nominating Committee and in their
28

NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A(4), supra note __.

29

NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A(3), supra note ___.

30

Collins, supra note __.

31

We owe this version of the thought experiment to Jim Agger.
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SOX mandated separate meetings. Within a few years, we will become familiar with a
new figure in the boardroom, the independent directors’ counsel or “IDC.”
This conclusion is impelled by several considerations. As the previous survey
suggests, the amount of legal counseling generated by the audit committee in particular,
and the independent directors in general, has reached a level where directors will seek
special counsel and lawyers will specialize in providing such counsel.32
Once this threshold is passed, the question becomes whether Audit Committee
members will prefer to be counseled by the company’s in-house general counsel (when
there is one), or the company’s main outside law firm, or prefer an independent lawyer.
As noted earlier, SOX mandates that the Audit Committee have the option of retaining
independent counsel at company expense. The new regulations accentuate the
differences in, and therefore the potential conflicts between, the roles of managers and
independent directors that have always been present. The Audit Committee function,
under the new system, is almost explicitly adversarial. The Compensation Committee,
while less heavily regulated, faces conflicts of interest when setting the CEO’s
compensation. The Nominating Committee in nominating directors must exhibit
independence. Finally, the board as a whole, in making the decision to retain or
terminate the CEO, similarly can find itself with interests adverse to the current
management team. With these conflicting interests, retaining the IDC from an
independent firm is not merely reasonable but virtually imperative.
This development would go against the grain of contemporary corporate culture,
but it is not necessarily bad. Separating the lawyer roles by retaining an IDC may even be
necessary to preserve productive team work. The complexity and variety of the different
roles played by lawyers in a post-SOX board room and executive suite are so varied and
conflicting that unless the roles are differentiated, the general counsel may be unable to
fulfill his duties to the independent directors and also be a member of the management
team. SOX has not created these conflicts, merely highlighted and intensified them. How
can the lawyer who is advising the management team on the legal aspects of acquisitions
also be advising the compensation committee on management compensation and advising
the Audit Committee on its oversight functions?
IV.

The IDC: Emerging Role and Implications

Suppose that we are right and that a not insignificant number of firms end up hiring
IDC to represent the independent directors. How will this change the corporate world?
What sorts of problems are likely to emerge? In the first subsection, we will look at
potential benefits. In the second, we will examine problems.
A.

32

Transforming the Teamwork Model in the Board Room?

Indeed, lawyers post SOX have already started marketing themselves in this way.
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One fairly explicit goal of SOX is to transform the boardroom. We take no
position on whether this is a good thing or a bad thing (or even on what would count as a
change). Rather, in this subsection, we are interested in how the emergence of an IDC
will affect boardroom decision-making, and how these new institutional structures will fit
with existing understandings of the lawyer’s role.
i. From Status Quo to New Frontier
The traditional model of corporate governance has been of a harmonious board
advising a CEO who is both chairman of the board and president of the company. The
CEO sets company policy, selects and directs the staff (including legal counsel both
inside and outside), nominates the directors, and frames the board agendas. The agendas
are routinely approved on the basis of discussion limited to explication of management
purposes and premises, and without dissent. A board member with differences or
reservations voices them quietly and then, if dissatisfied, resigns or, more typically,
simply declines re-nomination in the annual election of directors.
The concept governing the relationship is “team.” “Teamwork” implies the
absence of overt dissent from board members, staff members or outside consultants,
particularly the accountants and lawyers. In the traditional model, achieving top level
management status is highly competitive but positions are generally secure after arrival.
Corrective pressure comes from outside, in the form of the competition, the regulatory
authorities, and decline of the company’s stock price. Occasionally, sometimes more
often, advice is sought from outside consulting firms. Even then, there is usually no
dissent at the top, inasmuch as outside consulting firms typically made findings and
recommendations that had been anticipated if not scripted by management.33
This traditional model has been under pressure from many directions and for
many years. Since the beginning of the 1980s, takeovers – hostile, quasi-hostile and
friendly – have posed a threat to the status quo. Institutional investors have become more
active. Boards have become more independent. One measure of the extent of the
transformation is that CEO tenure has steadily declined.34
33

The level of internal harmony contrasted with the mood in other arenas of discourse, where debate was
open and sometimes rancorous: Relations with organized labor; with federal regulatory agencies and
sometimes those at the state level; in politics (particularly after the New Deal and its Democratic
successors); and some sectors of academia. In some local business communities a more contentious style
was accepted, for example, in Texas and Hollywood. However, the contentious climates in these other
arenas if anything reinforced the model of quiet consensus that prevailed in predominant business circles.

34

Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses
to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 883 n. 58 (2002) citing See Tom Neff and Dayton Ogden,
Anatomy of a CEO, Chief Executive 30, 31 (Feb 2001) (reporting that median tenure of CEOs in office
declined from seven years in 1980 to five years in 2000); Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 56 J Fin at 2278-79
(cited in note 48) (finding an increase in forced CEO turnover in the 1971 to 1994 period); Denis B.K.
Lyons, CEO Casualties: A Battlefront Report, Directors & Boards 43 (Summer 1999) (reporting that the
percentage of Fortune 100 companies with CEOs with tenure of five years or less increased from 46% in
1980 to 58% in 1998); CEO Turnover Up, SF Bus Times (July 6, 2001), available online at
<http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2001/07/0 2/daily32.html> (visited Mar 29, 2002)
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In combination with existing trends, the emergence of the IDC may spark further
evolution.35 With the presence of the IDC, the model of the boardroom may shift from
“team work” in which differences of agreement are submerged and resolved outside the
board room to a more open board room discussion in which board meetings become less
ceremonial and more frank, even contentious, and in which competing views are
presented and resolved.
ii. The New Board and the Old Rules
A new board reality would put pressure on the existing approaches to
representation. Under the traditional model, lawyers, those both in inside legal
departments and in outside firms, were expected to conform to the teamwork ideal. The
securities laws and evolving common law liability rules reinforced the model. Lawyers
were gatekeepers against illegal misconduct and evidence of such misconduct. Overt
dissent over legal and accounting issues would create evidence that, through adverse
discovery, could be devastating in later litigation.
Rule 1.13 of the American Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct can be
interpreted in light of the teamwork model of intra-corporate relationships. The
underlying themes in Rule 1.13 for relations between legal counsel and a corporate client
are caution, consultation and subordination. The key terms concern the objective to be
pursued, the information on which a lawyer’s intervention may be based, and the
procedures to be adopted when action is appropriate.
The objective of the lawyer’s function in corporate representation is defined in
Rule 1.13 as serving the “best interest of the organization.” This is an entirely appropriate
definition but a different one can be imagined. The lawyer’s function could have been
defined in stricter “gatekeeper” terms, for example “assuring compliance with legal
requirements.” The “best interest” standard is more ambiguous and hence less imperative.
The standard of information specified in Rule 1.13 as a basis of action is that of
knowledge, whereas a more skeptical level could have been specified such as “reason to
believe” or suspicion. The appropriate responsive action is framed in terms of
reconsideration, review, and resort to higher corporate authority.

(reporting increase in turnover in Fortune 1000 companies); Drake Beam Morin, CEO Turnover and Job
Security 8 (Special Report 2000) (finding "increased turnover and job loss at the highest corporate level" in
an international study); Lorri Grube, CEOs at Risk, Chief Executive 42 (Nov 1, 1995) (reporting that
executive turnover increased by more than a fourth between 1992 and 1995).
35

We do not claim that SOX-induced changes will be the proximate cause of a change in the model of
board governance. Many other factors come into play, with legal change being only one of them. If SOX
is the catalyst for significant change, in will likely be because of a general acknowledgement that a less
consensual boardroom may be appropriate, at least for some companies some of the time. Our point is that
for those companies that shift their governance structure, the IDC is likely to play a critical role.
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Moreover, these prescribed responses in fact presupposed that the lawyer who
confronts a problematic situation typically will be a member of a multi-member law
department or outside law firm, not a solo. In that context, ordinarily it would be a junior
lawyer who first encounters troublesome facts, but a senior lawyer who would decide
what to do. The transmission between them would itself require time, consultation and
deliberation. The decision about action would be made by the senior, who would be fully
mindful of the “team” ethos.
In academic discussion of the corporate lawyer’s responsibilities under Rule 1.13,
a standard hypothetical concerned a young lawyer discovering that operatives in the
engineering department were about to poison a city’s reservoir, the issue then being
whether the lawyer could “go to the authorities.” It is, however, a virtual certainty that no
such scenario would occur in real life. Rather, in the bureaucratized world of today the
sequence would be much less dramatic: The young lawyer might discover that the
engineering department was not properly documenting its water-purity certifications.
Appropriate response to that situation certainly would not involve going anywhere
outside the corporate structure. And, almost certainly, it would not include pushing the
matter all the way up to the corporation’s board of directors.
It is of course impossible to establish whether the cautious approach to the
corporate lawyer’s responsibilities in Rule 1.13 has properly served legitimate corporate
interests in the long run. In our estimate, those interests have been adequately served by
the rule as it stands. Or at least that a more stringent standard would not on balance have
better served long run corporate interests. Most corporate officials are honest and try to
obey the law and are encouraged to consult legal counsel. At the same time, there is no
way to compel a recalcitrant corporate official to consult a lawyer, or to prevent
concealment of illegal machinations by management or high level employees from the
legal department. Tycoons compartmentalize their legal work among different firms,
clever but corrupt bookkeepers can conceal embezzlements for a long time.
The emergence of the IDC potentially shifts the balance with respect to the
lawyers’ roles. A useful framework for analyzing this prospect is the “Cheek Report,” the
now-common term for the Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility, March 31, 2003. The stature of the Report is suggested by
reference to the composition of the Task Force: Top level corporate lawyers and
academics headed by James Cheek, long associated with the Legal Advisory Committee
of the New York Stock Exchange.
The Cheek Report made many important recommendations addressed to
corporate governance, particularly the roles of independent directors and of corporate
counsel. Concerning corporate counsel, the report recommended revision of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6 (governing the scope of
permissible “whistle-blowing”) and Rule 1.13 (governing corporate counsel's
responsibilities to the organization). Concerning independent directors, it recommended
much greater autonomy through several specific changes, addressed below. But the report
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did not proceed to what seems to us the necessary conclusion--that the independent
directors of a public company have their own legal counsel.
In fact there were two Cheek Reports, a Preliminary Report, July 16, 2002, and
the final Report issued nine months later. The Preliminary Report proposed enhanced
autonomy for the independent directors, as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•

A “substantial majority” of the board should be independent;
A board committee constituted of independent directors charged with
nominating successor independent directors;
Audit and compensation committees constituted of independent directors;
A corporate governance committee constituted of independent directors and
charged with general authority over regulatory compliance, and authorized to
retain independent counsel;
Some committee of independent directors to review transactions involving
directors or executive officers of the company;
Some committee of independent directors to have regular private meetings
with general counsel.36

These proposals were carried forward and elaborated in the Final Report.
The Preliminary Report recommended changes in Rule 1.13 that would encourage
corporate counsel to take action when confronting serious management misconduct.
Regarding Rule 1.13 as it stands, the Preliminary Report stated:
The Task Force believes that the [text of present Rule 1.13] unduly emphasizes
the avoidance of “disruption” of the organization while playing down the more
important goal of minimizing harm resulting from the misconduct. (Emphasis in
original.)37
It will be appreciated that there is a correspondence between the term “team play”
(describing the proper role of corporate counsel in the old regime) and the term
“disruption” (in Rule 1.13, describing what is to be avoided if possible). “Disruption” is
violation of “team play.” The Final Report accordingly recommended several specific
changes in Rule 1.13 to shift the emphasis in the direction of protecting the company.
So far so good. But the Final Report has an interesting footnote, number 54. The
footnote annotates the following statement:

36

Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, July 16,
2002, pp. 17-21.

37

Preliminary Report, supra note __, p. 28.
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[L]awyers must…retain professional detachment…even at the risk of being
perceived as…obstructive of the business plans sought by the corporation's
executive officers. There are times…when the corporate lawyer…must assure
that the corporate client retains other counsel who can exercise the
requisite professional detachment.
Footnote 54 then says:
It has been suggested that such considerations warrant, as a matter of regular
practice, the retention of counsel other than general corporate counsel to
advise the board of directors or one of its committees. The Task Force
believes that such a practice generally would not be desirable. Apart from
the cost, the division of management and the board of directors into two
separately counseled factions may result in less open communication,
less constructive collaboration…and, ultimately, less effective oversight
by the board of directors. The Task Force recognizes…that there may be
situations in which separate counsel…may be necessary or desirable.
It would be too strong to say that the Final Report thus takes away in this footnote
what had been proposed in the text. However, it is clearly contemplated that independent
directors under the SOX regime, particularly those on the audit, compensation and
governance committees, can effectively discharge their new, heavy and legally
ambiguous responsibilities while being counseled only by the company's general counsel
and members of the law department reporting to general counsel.38
One can understand why the Task Force would include the reservation presented
in footnote 54. The transition from the old “teamwork” regime to the new SOX regime
has been sudden and unanticipated. The bar was not prepared for it: The ABA Ethics2000
Commission had not recommended changes that would readjust the balance in Rule 1.13
between “teamwork” and “disruption,” and the Commission's recommendations for Rule
1.6 concerning “whistle-blowing” against financial fraud had been rejected by the House
of Delegates. In hearings addressed to its Preliminary Report, the Task Force was
confronted by the passionate rhetoric of the American College of Trial Lawyers,
denouncing any change in the “core values” of confidentiality and loyalty to client.39 The
ABA House of Delegates has since adopted the changes to Rules 1.6 and 1.13
38

Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, March 31, 2003 (“The
Final Report”), at 48, makes the point about the importance of clients being able to engage in full and frank
communications with their lawyers. This goal has already been complicated when the client is an
organization, because there is no expectation of confidentiality vis a vis other corporate actors when a
corporate actor consults with corporate counsel. That said, the underlying point has strength and provides
guidance for structuring the governance structure to promote full and frank communication as a practical
matter, even if the protections (and inducements to full and frank disclosures) of the attorney client
privilege do not apply. One advantage of the IDC is that it has the practical effect of assisting in the full &
frank communication by the independent directors, communications that they may feel uncomfortable
having with the GC.
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The stance taken by the College brings to mind the observation made by Talleyrand about the Bourbons
of the Old Regime in France: “They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing.”
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recommended by the Cheek Report. The change in Rule 1.6 is formally more substantial,
but that in Rule 1.13, calling for more positive action by counsel, probably is more
significant as a practical matter.
One can of course understand that independent directors could find themselves
and their counsel falling into “two separately counseled factions,” as said in footnote 54.
But that misfortune is not inevitable, nor, in our opinion, even probable. There are many
very good lawyers who have the diplomatic skills along with technical competence quite
sufficient to provide tough but polite and constructive counsel to a board committee
committed to the welfare of the company. Indeed, some versions of corporate
management philosophy call for decision by “confrontation,” and regard that as a positive
form of “teamwork.” 40 And, in all probability, a company reaching the stage of
“separately counseled factions” would have had previous conflicts that, under the SOX
legal regime, would have required resignation of someone, either in management, or on
the board, or in corporate counsel's office.
The Cheek Report, itself, in grappling with the new duties that result from SOX,
agrees with the importance of having the independent directors meet regularly outside the
presence of “any senior executive officer,” a requirement that was also part of the NYSE
listing rule reforms. But, as soon as this step is taken, the question of an IDC arises
sharply. Who will attend the meeting from which senior management is excluded? Will
a lawyer be present and, if so, who? In general, one would think, the inside general
counsel of a firm should be considered a “senior executive officer.” If so, he cannot
attend. If the general counsel is disqualified for this reason, it is hardly in the spirit of the
reforms for a lawyer who works under the disqualified general counsel to advise the
independent directors. Thus, either the meeting has to be held without a lawyer being
present (clearly a bad idea) or the independent directors will need an IDC.
Concerning this last point: Perhaps the Task Force, thoughtful as its Report
certainly is, has not taken full account of the new roles and new responsibilities that result
from SOX.
B.

New Roles, New Responsibilities

The Cheek Report is largely focused on preventing violations of law. That focus
– understandable given the long debates over the model rules – ignores the extent to
which SOX seeks to restructure decision-making within the corporation. When the IDC
emerges, counsel will play as large a role in implementing this new governance structure
as it will in preventing violations of the law by the executive group. The general
counsel’s relationship with the management team is precisely what gets in the way of the
GC guiding the independent directors through their governance obligations. This is so
whether or not one accepts the premise of the Task Force that, in the rare instance in
which law breaking by one of the management team is involved, the GC can effectively
undertake to act.
40
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i. New ways to discharge old responsibilities
Once an IDC is in place and is providing on-going guidance to the independent
directors, one would expect that the IDC will take a lead role on those matters that
currently require a special committee. Thus, we expect the IDC to change the process by
which a board can take control of derivative litigation against senior management. While
formerly it may have been necessary to hire new directors to staff a special litigation
committee, and to hire new counsel to advise the committee, now it may be possible – if
the directors are sufficiently independent – to delegate the decision whether to sue to the
outside directors as a group, as advised by the IDC.
Similarly, in parent-subsidiary mergers, the IDC, if present, may play a similar
role. The application of SOX and the other reforms to transactions involving controlled
subsidiaries is complex. The NYSE Proposed Rules, for example, exempt controlled
subsidiaries (defined as “a company of which more than 50% of the voting power is held
by an individual, a group or another company”) from a number of key requirements: a
majority of independent directors; a nominating/corporate governance committee
composed entirely of independent directors; and a compensation committee composed
entirely of independent directors.41 But such companies are still subject to the Audit
Committee requirements. One can certainly imagine a situation in which an Audit
Committee, advised by its IDC, will play the role currently played by a special committee
in a parent-subsidiary merger.
Finally, in the context of an internal investigation, one can again expect that the
IDC, already carrying the responsibility of advising the Audit Committee on its
investigations, would be well positioned to advise the Audit Committee or another
committee of the board concerning a special investigation.
In all of these situations, when the IDC is genuinely independent, the IDC can
potentially do a better job than outside counsel hired just for the engagement. The IDC
will be more familiar with the company and will have already established a relationship
with the independent directors.
ii. A New Player in Control Transactions?
As discussed earlier, the role of counsel to the special committee of independent
directors is already familiar in the management buyout and parent-subsidiary merger
transactional contexts. In both situations, the special committee takes center stage in
representing the interests of the public shareholders. Counsel to the special committee, as
we have seen, plays a crucial role in guiding the independent directors through their
responsibilities. One interesting unresolved issue under Delaware law is how aggressive
the special committee can be in pursuing the interests of the public shareholders. Can it,
for example, adopt a poison pill to block a parent company tender offer for the minority
41
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shares to be followed by a short form merger, thereby avoiding Weinberger “entire
fairness” scrutiny?42 If, in the face of such a defensive tactic by the special committee,
the parent company replaces the directors with new directors who redeem the poison pill,
what level of scrutiny will the Delaware courts apply to that action?
Now imagine that we become accustomed to the presence of an IDC. What
implications does this have for Delaware M & A jurisprudence? One possibility is that a
defensive tactic adopted by the independent directors advised by the IDC will be entitled
to greater deference than a defensive measure adopted by the board as a whole
represented by corporate counsel. The Delaware courts already give substantially greater
deference to decisions by independent boards than inside boards.43
It would be but a short step beyond existing jurisprudence for the Delaware courts
to grant similar or greater deference to decisions made by independent directors advised
by the IDC. Just as Delaware jurisprudence has piggy-backed on the emergence of
independent directors – relying on them when they act independently and encouraging
their emergence by granting their decisions deference – so too could Delaware piggy
back on the emergence of the IDC.44
iii. In CEO Retention or Dismissal
The 1992 dismissal of General Motors CEO Robert Stempel, under pressure from
outside directors, marked a watershed in American corporate governance. GM’s outside
directors, concerned with the direction of the company, retained Ira Millstein as counsel
on an ad hoc basis. Millstein tutored the outside directors on their obligations, and
guided them through a process that ultimately led to the humiliating dismissal of
Stempel.45 The GM boardroom uprising is an example of what organized and well
counseled outside directors can do, if they choose to. It is an experience that has not been
forgotten. CEOs will recognize the possibility that a standing IDC, providing continuing
counseling to the independent directors, will result in better organized independent
directors, and less secure CEOs. One can therefore predict opposition to the appointment
of an IDC.

42

Jeff Gordon & Ron Gilson, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785(2003).
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See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“In the face of this inherent conflict directors must
show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed because of another person's stock ownership. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d at 554-55. However, they
satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation. ..." Id. at 555. Furthermore, such
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independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.”) (emphasis added).
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C.

Some other (non?) issues.

In this section, we address some of the objections that will be raised.
i. Who speaks for the corporation?
One objection to the IDC is that it will create confusion in the boardroom. With
the multiplication of corporate counsel, some might argue, it will be unclear “who speaks
for the corporation.”
The quick response to this objection is that it is misconceived. Basic corporate
law makes clear that it is the board of directors which speaks for the corporation, not
corporate counsel, IDC, outside directors, nor, for that matter, the CEO.
The more complete answer is that who, in fact, speaks for the corporation will
depend, as it always has, on the context. Sometimes, the general counsel speaks for the
corporation when, for example, the issue is the conduct of litigation with some third
party. Other times, the CEO speaks for the corporation when, for example, the
corporation is called to testify in front of a Congressional committee. Sometimes, the
full board of directors speaks for the corporation, when , for example, the issue is the
incurring of large indebtedness. Sometimes, only the board and the shareholders together
can speak for the corporation, when, for example, the issue is whether to merge with
another firm.
ii. Confidentiality
A persisting problem in any client-lawyer relationship with an organization is that
of maintaining client confidences in an appropriate way. Confidences about a client must
be maintained in confidence, not only as a matter of immediate duty but also because
disclosure to outsiders can result in embarrassment as a practical matter and loss of the
right of confidentiality as a legal matter. At the same time, confidential information must
be employed in carrying out the representation. The necessary transmissions may be
within the organization or to outsiders.
With an organization client, it is the organization that is the client, not any
specific person. As stated in Model Rules 1.13(a), “A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization…” This proposition derives from corporation
law itself.46 Thus, not even the CEO unqualifiedly “personifies” the corporation in
relationships with legal counsel.47 On the contrary, identifying the relevant participants
in the confidential relationship is a continuing problem in the client-lawyer relationship
with a corporation or other organization.
46
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As a general proposition and under ordinary circumstances, the practical rule is
simply to treat all members of the enterprise as within the circle of confidentiality.
Certainly, there is no occasion for going outside that circle unless serious legal harm to
the company is threatened by some course of action or inaction by corporate personnel. If
that threat involves financial issues, SOX may require counsel to go “up the ladder”
within the corporation. The Rules of professional Conduct would require similar response
by the lawyer whether or not the issue was financial, for example, environmental
regulation of employment legal obligations.48 But going up the ladder within the
corporation does not breach confidentiality. Every higher official to whom the lawyer
could resort would also be within the corporation's confidentiality circle. The circle
would include the group of inside directors having the special authority and responsibility
that is formalized in SOX.
However, a sensitive choice of pathway could be involved. Suppose the
company's inside general counsel discovers that the chief financial officer has concealed
accounting problems that should be corrected. Presumably, the first response is to turn to
the CFO, asking rectification of the accounts. The CFO replies that the issue has been
reviewed and approved by the CEO. Does the general counsel now go to the CEO, as the
next rung on the corporate ladder? Or to the board as a whole, in accordance with the
normal corporate hierarchy above the CEO? Or to the independent directors, in
accordance with the mandate apparently prescribed by SOX? Suppose that the general
counsel suspects that the CEO was involved in the concealment in the first place, and that
the two officers may further manipulate the accounts in order to cover up?49
None of these pathways would involve disclosure of confidences outside the
corporate entity, because all the parties involved are constituents of the corporation and
not outsiders. Moreover, each one of them could consult independent counsel, on the
premise that a fiduciary's consultation with his or her own lawyer is not a breach of
confidence on the part of the fiduciary. That would apply also to the insider directors if
they already had or then retained their own special counsel. If the matter is resolved
quietly and peacefully, no outside disclosure would be necessary or proper.
However, suppose the matter is not resolved quietly. Rather, the CEO (advised by
independent counsel he has retained) insists that the accounts remain as reported, whereas
the independent directors, advised by their special counsel, conclude that the accounts
should be restated. Can the independent directors take action requiring disclosure to
outsiders, for example, the SEC?
It seems to us that the logic of corporate law and of SOX require the conclusion
that the independent directors can “go public” to the extent they reasonably deem
necessary to carry out their responsibilities to the company. The hypothetical sequence of
48
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events has reposed on the independent directors responsibility to act in the best interest of
the company and, in the hypothesis, they have concluded that interdiction is necessary.
That could have been the scenario in WorldCom, for example. If the independent
directors so concluded, their special counsel would properly advise them that they could
make outside disclosures as necessary. And their special counsel would thereby have
acted consistent with his professional responsibility. As stated in ABA Model Rule 1.6(a)
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless…the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation…
Perhaps needless to say, it would not be a happy day for anyone concerned.
iii. Attorney Client Privilege
Distinct from the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is the attorney client privilege.
The duty of confidentiality imposes a (qualified) burden of secrecy on the lawyer
concerning disclosures of “information relating to the representation,” in the terminology
of Rule 1.6. The duty thus covers information whatever its source and prohibits
disclosure wherever and to whomever, in court or outside. The attorney client privilege
has a lesser scope and is differently directed. The privilege applies only to
communications from the client in seeking legal assistance and responses from the lawyer
in connection thereto. It is a rule addressed to inquiring persons, whether courts or other
parties, and directs that they not seek the protected matter. The privilege is that of the
client but ordinarily is invoked by the attorney on behalf of the client.50
The attorney client privilege generally applies to communications between
corporate personnel and legal counsel.51 The typical context for its application is a legal
dispute between the corporation and a third party. The privilege can also apply in
disputes between “constituents” of the company, for example, between an officer or
former officer and the company or, in the derivative suit context, between shareholders
and the company management. However, in the latter context there is often difficulty and
confusion as to those for and against whom the privilege may be asserted. The problem is
often referred to as that in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, the 1970 Fifth Circuit case in which it
was addressed.52
The issue, stated in general terms, concerns the circumstances in which the
attorney client privilege, normally operative for the corporation against third parties,
should not protect one corporate constituent against another. In Garner, the dispute was
between plaintiffs in a shareholder derivative action and incumbent management. The
50
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Garner exception has since been applied in a variety of circumstances. Application of
Garner can readily be imagined in a dispute between inside directors and incumbent or
former management. Unfortunately, formulation of the concept was and is in very
ambiguous terms. As set forth in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,
Section 85, it is as follows:
In a proceeding involving a dispute between an organizational client
and shareholders, members, or other constituents…the attorney-client
privilege of the organization may be withheld…if…the need of the
requesting party…is sufficiently compelling and the threat to
confidentiality sufficiently confined to justify setting the privilege
aside.
We venture to say that in a dispute in which the independent directors are seeking
information from any other constituent of the corporation – top management or even the
majority of the board – in an subject within the scope of SOX, the Garner principle will
“justify setting the privilege aside.” The independent directors in such a dispute would
have the highest level of fiduciary responsibility and the public policy of SOX would
most strongly militate in favor of disclosure. By the same token, however, the
independent directors would probably have the strongest case for privilege for their
communications with special counsel in their inquiry and deliberations concerning that
subject matter. In any event, the disclosure could be limited to the immediate
controversy through imposition of a protective order by the court in which the dispute is
pending.
However, predicting application of the rule of privilege on the Garner exception
is necessarily somewhat speculative. Moreover, the problem could arise among officials
who, at the time of the underlying transaction, had a close and trusting relationship with
each other. These conditions signify that the lawyer's duty to define the professional
relationship is especially important. That duty is expressed in Model Rule 1.13(D) as
follows:
In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall
explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the organization's interests are
adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing.
This provision sometimes is colloquially called the “corporate Miranda warning,”
harking to the warning that police must give to criminal suspects. That description
indicates the unpleasantness of the occasion on which the message must be delivered and
the anxiety and perhaps anger with which it would be received. Nevertheless, the
message must be transmitted in the interest of fairness to the individuals involved, of
protection of the corporate interest, and of the lawyer's own legal responsibility. Failure
to give the warning could result in loss of privilege for the corporation, accrual of
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privilege to an individual who supposes that he was individually represented, and conflict
of interest for the lawyer on the basis that he had multiple clients.
Where the independent directors have special counsel, the warning requirement
will apply to them. A separate warning may be required on the part of the regular general
counsel as well. The whole exchange no doubt will appear as legal persiflage to some of
the directors, but it ought to be done – and confirmed in writing.
iv. Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes a new federal regime on top of traditional state
corporation law. SOX does not impose significantly different duties on corporate officers
or directors or legal counsel compared with those that have long been established by state
corporate law and state professional regulations.53 However, SOX makes these duties in
many contexts a matter of federal law, which is itself significant, and their enforcement a
matter for the SEC. Neither corporate officials nor layers will want to “mess with the
feds.”
The Future of Board Governance
The Delaware general corporation law tells us that the “business and affairs of the
corporation are managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.”54 But how
board governance in fact occurs is, and has always been, an evolving process in which
business practices, market pressures and changing legal requirements meet. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted against the backdrop of corporate scandals, was designed to
change board governance. How, exactly, it will do so remains to be seen. Following the
rule of unintended consequences, we predict that the new requirements will be the final
push that will lead to the emergence of counsel for the independent directors. Whether
that will be a good thing for corporate governance, corporate responsibility or corporate
profitability remains to be seen.
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